

THE ESTONIAN BUREAU OF THE CPSU CC 1944–1947

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After the occupation of Estonia and Latvia in 1944, (in Latvian Courland, the Germans surrendered first in May 1945), Moscow needed a complementary institution that would control the sovietisation process in all three Baltic union republics. Moscow could not fully trust the local leadership of the union republics. Furthermore, in the Baltic union republics, it was necessary to implement policies that the local leaders had no experience of. Therefore, in Moscow's opinion, the leaders of union republics also needed "practical" instruction in implementing the resumed sovietisation process. In November-December 1944, separate bureaus of the Central Committee of the Communist (bolshevist) Party of the Soviet Union (hereinafter the CPSU CC) were formed for all the Baltic union republics (and in 1945, also for the Moldavian SSR), to fulfil the functions of control and assistance. The Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC was formed in early November 1944, proceeding from the decision of the Organisational Bureau from 30 October 1944 "On the deficiencies and tasks of the Communist Party organisation of the Estonian SSR".

Such institutions were quite exceptional in the structure of the Communist Party those days, as no normative documents of the CP stipulated the formation of this kind of organs. Yet it should be observed that this kind of extraordinary institutions had been used in the USSR before. From a more general analysis of the practices of the central USSR authorities in implementing the process of sovietisation, it is evident that ever since 1920s, the formation of institutions of extraordinary bureaus or special representatives that would function as an extended arm of the Central Committee of the Communist (bolshevist) Party of Russia (CPR, one of the previous names of the CPSU) in regions where it was intended to apply Moscow's policies soonest possible, was one of the most characteristic traits of their policy. Also the Far East Bureau (1920–1925), the Caucasian Bureau (1920–1922), and the Turkestan Bureau (1920–1922) of the CPR CC had a similar role, as well as the Central Asian Bureau of the CPR CC in 1922–1934.

After the occupation of the Baltic States in summer 1940 the issue of the "extended arm" of Moscow in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was solved by instituting an office of the plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR, who later became representatives of the CPSU and of the Council of the People's Commissars. Officially, these representatives – the former representatives of the Soviet Union in Estonia Vladimir Bochkaryov (in Estonia) Nikolay Pozdnyakov (in Lithuania) and Vladimir Derevyanski (in Latvia) – were appointed to office on the session of the Politburo on 16 September 1940.¹ In 1944, when the Baltic States once again were occupied, the institution of representatives was not reinstated, and the Bureaus of respective union republics to the CPSU CC were formed instead to continue the activities of the representatives' institution of 1940.²

The bureaus of the union republics were an institution seldom addressed by the Soviet historians, even if the existence of this extension of Moscow's arm was not passed over in complete silence. The first comprehensive treatises of the history of the Estonian SSR, edited by Gustav Naan, do not

¹ *Советское руководство. Переписка. 1928–1941 гг.* (Soviet Leadership, Correspondence, 1928–1941) (Moscow: РОССПЭН, 1999), 438, footnote 7.

² The functions of the union republic bureaus of the CPSU CC and the institution of the union republic representative of the CPSU CC had similar functions – this is also corroborated by the fact that in the Russian State Social and Political History Archives, their materials are kept in the same fund (*Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории: Краткий справочник. Справочно-информационные материалы к документальным и музейным фондам РГАСПИ*, Выпуск 3 (Moscow: РГАСПИ, 2004), 106).

mention the formation of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC. In the 1952 edition there is a separate subchapter on struggle against bourgeois nationalism, but that concentrates on the March Plenum in 1950³ and fails to point out how the “great struggle” had begun or what role the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC had had in the whole process.⁴ The Bureau is mentioned neither in the second edition of 1957,⁵ nor in the third volume of the *History of the Estonian SSR* published in 1971.⁶ The outline of the history of the ECP, published in 1972, on the other hand, no longer hushes up the decision of the Organisational Bureau of the CPSU CC from 30 October 1944 “On Deficiencies and Tasks of the CP Organisations in Estonia” and points out that the decision formed, alongside with several others, a basis for “improvement of the party political and ideological work of the ECP”.⁷

Nor does this publication fail to mention the guidelines that the decision gave for enhancing the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, promotion of ideological work and supervision of cultural spheres.⁸ A mention is made also of the formation of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC on 11 November 1944 “to render constant practical assistance” to the leaders of the union republic.⁹ Yet it is characteristic that no connection is pointed out between the formation of the Estonian Bureau and the 30 October decision, and no closer mention is made of other measures that accompanied the implementation of the decision. These positions of the official party history are reflected also in the comprehensive work *The People of Estonia in the Great Patriotic War*¹⁰ and in the concise outline of the history of the ECP published in 1983.¹¹ Aleksandr Pankseyev, one of the leading party historians of the time, as well as one of the ideologists of party history research, stated about the Estonian Bureau that “this unconventional supervisory institution helped the CC of the CPSU to keep contact with the party organisation of the union republic and operatively

³ On the March Plenum of the ECP CC in 1950, a considerable part of the ECP CC and the ESSR leadership was dismissed and replaced by people considered more appropriate by the central authorities. As a result of the plenum decisions, a cleansing was carried out also among the Estonian intelligentsia.

⁴ Gustav Naan (ed), *Eesti NSV ajalugu (kõige vanemast ajast tänapäevani)* (History of the Estonian SSR (from Ancient Times till Today)), (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1952), 443–444.

⁵ Gustav Naan (ed), *Eesti NSV ajalugu (kõige vanemast ajast tänapäevani)*, (History of the Estonian SSR (from Ancient Times till Today)), 2nd edition, (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1957), 577.

⁶ Viktor Maamägi (Editor-in-Chief), *Eesti NSV ajalugu, 3. köide: 1917. aasta märtsist kuni 50-ndate aastate alguseni* (History of the Estonian SSR: from March 1917 to Early 1950s), (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1971).

⁷ *Ülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost, 3. osa (juuli 1940 – 1958. aasta)* (An Outline of the History of the Estonian Communist Party, Part 3 (July 1940 – 1958)) (Tallinn: Partei Ajaloo Instituut, 1972), 213.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 215, 282. There is also a reference that in August 1946, the implementation of the decision from 30 October 1944 in the ESSR was specifically discussed on the ECP CC Plenum.

⁹ *Ülevaade*, 191.

¹⁰ Leonid Lentsman (Editor-in-Chief), *Eesti rahvas Suures Isamaasõjas. 2. köide: Eesti rahvas võitluses Nõukogudemaa täieliku vabastamise ja sõja võiduka lõpuleviimise eest aastail 1944–1945* (The People of Estonia in the Great Patriotic War. Volume 2: The People of Estonia in the Struggle for the Complete Liberation of the USSR and the Victorious Conclusion of the War in 1944–1945), (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat 1977), 446.

¹¹ Aleksander Pankseyev (ed), *Lühiülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost* (A Brief Outline of the History of the Estonian Communist Party) (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1983), 123.

steer its activities.”¹² Also, Pankseyev considered the formation of the bureau at the time to have been “fully justified”.¹³

The situation began to change in late 1980s, during the *perestroika*, when it became possible to start filling up the gaps of history, whether white or black, with somewhat more reliable information. Kalev Tammistu was the first to give closer attention to the events of 1944, and to disclose the unknown background of the March Plenum of 1950 in a series of articles, proceeding from so far unused data from the archives. This series also provided a closer treatment of the decision of the Organisational Bureau of the CPSU CC concerning Estonia, as well as the later measures.¹⁴ Also after the restoration of Estonia’s independence, the formation and activities of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC has been subjected to much more thorough scrutiny, both in specialised studies¹⁵ as well as comprehensive works.¹⁶ A book by Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi about the activities of the Bureau of the CC of the ECP, which also includes a lengthy description of the activities of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, deserves a special mention here.¹⁷

All the more recent studies named above are based on the materials of the Department of the Estonian State Archives (the former Party Archives), while no use has been made of the Bureau’s own documentation in the Russian State Archives of Social-Political History in Moscow. The materials of the above archives have, from the viewpoint of our subject, most extensively been used by Elena Zubkova, who in her works has handled with great professionalism the post-war sovietisation process of the Baltic States, including the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC.¹⁸ To some extent, also David Feest has used the Bureau’s documents in his thorough study on the post-war

¹² Aleksander Pankseyev, *Suure heitluse aastail. Eesti rahvas Nõukogude Liidu Suures Isamaasõjas aastail 1941–1945* (The Years of the Great Struggle. The People of Estonia in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union) (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1975), 94.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kalev Tammistu, „Tasalülitamine 5” (Assimilation 5), *Õhtuleht*, 3. mai 1989.

¹⁵ Enn Tarvel (comp), *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee organisatsiooniline struktuur 1940–1991* (The Organisational Structure of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party in 1940–1991), (Tallinn: Kistler-Ritso Eesti Sihtasutus, 2002), 39–41; Olaf Kuuli, *Sotsialistid ja kommunistid Eestis 1917–1991*. (Socialists and Communists in Estonia in 1917–1991) (Tallinn: O. Kuuli, 1999), 90.

¹⁶ Ago Pajur, Tõnu Tannberg (eds), *Eesti ajalugu VI. Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni* (Estonian History VI. From the War of Freedom to the Restoration of Independence) (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2005), 268–270.

¹⁷ Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi, *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d. Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei Keskkomitee büroo 162 etteastumist 1944–1956 vahemängude ja sissejuhatusega* (How the Estonian SSR Was Governed. 162 Addresses of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party from 1944–1956, with Interludes and Introductions) (Tallinn: Varrak, 2005), 100–104.

¹⁸ Елена Зубкова (Elena Zubkova), *Прибалтика и Кремль, 1940–1953, История сталинизма (The Baltics and the Kremlin in 1940–1953, the History of Stalinsim)*, (Moscow: РОССПЭН, 2008); Елена Зубкова, „Советский фактор в Балтийском регионе: кадровая политика как механизм советизации (1944–1947 гг)” – *Сталин. Сталинизм. Советское общество: Сборник статей* (The Soviet Factor in the Baltic Region: Cadre Politics as a Mechanism of Sovietisation (in 1944–1947) – Stalin. Stalinism. The Soviet Society: A Collection of Studies) (Moscow: ИРИ РАН, 2000), 194–211; Елена Зубкова, „Москва и Балтия: механизмы советизации Латвии, Литвы и Эстонии в 1944–1953 годах” – *Труды института российской истории*, Выпуск IV (Moscow and the Baltics: the Mechanism of the Sovietisation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in 1944–1953 – *Treatises of the Institute of Russian History*, Issue IV) (Moscow: ИРИ РАН, 2004), 266–283.

collectivisation in the Estonian SSR.¹⁹ Also research on the Latvian and Lithuanian Bureaus, e.g. by Geoffrey Swain²⁰ and Vyatutas Tininis, is relevant to our subject.²¹

Officially, the Estonian and Lithuanian Bureaus of the CPSU CC were formed by the decision of the Politburo from 11 November, and the Latvian Bureau by the decision from 29 December 1944.²² The formation of the bureaus was in fact one of the measures in the Kremlin's plan of the sovietisation of the Baltics, which was discussed in the Organisational Bureau of the CC of the CPSU in late October 1944 – early November 1944, and resulted in adopting decisions on “deficiencies and mistakes” in the work of the party organisations of all three Baltic union republics.²³ The formation of the Latvian Bureau of the CPSU CC at the end of December – later than the Estonian and Lithuanian Bureau were formed – was mostly due to the fact that a considerable part of Latvia was still a war zone at the time, and certainly not to some skilful action from the part of Latvian authorities that succeeded in postponing the formation of the bureau. The latter position is held by Veskimägi, who in this context calls Nikolai Karotamm a coward.²⁴ Nevertheless, it is beside the point to accuse Karotamm of cowardice in this context. Looking at the “self-analysis” of different union republics that preceded the adoption of the decision, we can see that the report sent to Moscow by Nikolai Karotamm is written in a rather reserved style.²⁵ Whereas the Latvian party leader Janis Kalnbērziņš informed the Kremlin already at that stage that they would not succeed with sovietisation on their own and therefore needed “cadre assistance”.²⁶

About the decision of the Politburo from 11 November on the formation of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, Karotamm informed the participants of the ECP CC Plenum in early December 1944 in the following way: “In addition, the Politburo of the CPSU CC decided on 11 November this year to form a Bureau of the CPSU CC in Estonia, consisting of five members [...]”²⁷

¹⁹ David Feest, *Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum. Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Dorfs 1944–1953* (Coercive Collectivisation in the Baltic Countries. The Sovietisation of Estonian Villages in 1944–1953) (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2007).

²⁰ Geoffrey Swain, “„Cleaning up Soviet Latvia”: the Bureau for Latvia (Latburo), 1944–1947” – Olaf Mertelsmann (ed), *The sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956* (Tartu: Kleio, 2003), 63–84.

²¹ Vyatutas Tininis, *Komunistinio režimo nuskaltimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, vol. 1 (Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2003), 98.

²² ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты 1945–1953 (CPSU CC and the Regional Party Committees in 1945–1953) (Moscow: РОССПЭН, 2004), 23.

²³ All these documents have now been published: Тынну Таннберг, *Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы (1944–1956). Исследования и документы, История сталинизма (Tõnu Tannberg: Moscow's Policies in the Baltic Countries in the Post-War Period (1944–1956). Research and Documents, Series History of Stalinism)* (Moscow: РОССПЭН, Фонд “Президентский центр Б. Н. Ельцина”, 2010).

²⁴ Veskimägi, 103.

²⁵ N. Karotamm's outline of the activities of the ECP CC, 24 October 1944, RGASPI 17.117.459, 6–58.

²⁶ J. Kalnbērziņš' letter to G. Malenkov, 2 November 1944, RGASPI 11.117.464, 21.

²⁷ N. Karotamm's report at the ECP CC Plenum, 1 December 1944 ERAF 1.4.104, 10. It should be taken into account that the stenography is quite poor, perhaps best described by Jüri Nuut, the People's Commissar of Education at the time, in a remark at the end of the text of his speech after having added numerous corrections. On 11 December 1944, Jüri Nuut has written: “The “shorthand” text in typescript is, especially towards the end, quite muddled, containing heaps of meaningless words and, at times, statements quite contrary to my utterances. I state categorically, that I have not made such muddled statements from the Presidium lectern. I have tried to correct it to achieve some rough correspondence to what I actually said” (ERAF 1.4.105, 81). Several speakers (e.g. H. Kruus) have

Nikolay Shatalin, who played quite an important role among the top authorities of the Kremlin, was appointed the Chairman of the Bureau. He stood very close to Georgi Malenkov, who in his turn belonged to Stalin's closest circles and ever since the second half of 1930s, was practically in charge of the cadre policies of the USSR. Shatalin was Malenkov's right hand in this kind of work. The fact that he – such an influential figure in the authorities – was appointed to Estonia at the end of 1944, was due to internal power squabbles in the Kremlin.²⁸ Georgi Malenkov's position was weakening and his competitors took the opportunity to banish Shatalin, one of his closest men, to take charge of sovietisation in Estonia. On 29 December 1944 he also became the Chairman of the Latvian Bureau.²⁹ The Lithuanian Bureau was entrusted to Mikhail Suslov, of whom some historians so far have assumed that he was “probably watching over the chairmen of the other two Baltic Bureaus”.³⁰ That was definitely not the case. At the time, Shatalin was still a much more important figure, while Suslov's emergence as an influential ideological guardian of the empire was still ahead.³¹ Suslov was dispatched to Lithuania from the office of Chairman of the Stavropol Kray Committee of the CPSU.³² The Lithuanian Bureau held its first meeting under the leadership of Mikhail Suslov on 21 December 1944.³³ Shatalin continued in charge of the Estonian Bureau until called back to Moscow in 1946,³⁴ when Georgiy Perov took over as the new Chairman. Just like Shatalin, also Perov was an influential man in the corridors of the Kremlin.

Educated as economist, Perov had been, in the second half of 1930s, a leading party figure in Leningrad, and after that for a brief period worked in the Party Control Committee, in the State Bank and in 1939–1944 as the Deputy of the Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU CC.³⁵ At the end of 1944, when the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC was formed, he was

probably provided the stenographers with a written copy of their speech. Karotamm has not made any amendments to the typescript.

²⁸ Юрий Жуков, *Сталин: тайны власти* (Yuri Zhukov, *Stalin: The Secrets of Power*) (Moscow: ВАГРИУС, 2005), 274–276.

²⁹ About the formation of the Latvian Bureau of the CPSU CC and the activities of Shatalin, see more: Swain, 63–84.

³⁰ Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *Balti riigid: sõlтеаastad 1940–1990* (The Baltic States: Years of Dependence) (Tallinn: Koolibri, 1997), 82.

³¹ About the Lithuanian period of Suslov, see more: Donald O'Sullivan, „Reconstruction and Repression – the Role of M. A. Suslov in Lithuania, 1944–1946,” *Forum für Osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte*, Heft 1 (2000): 175–208.

³² Жуков, 275.

³³ Tininis, 98.

³⁴ After his period as Chairman of the Estonian and Latvian bureaus of the CPSU CC, Shatalin became a member of the Organisational Bureau and the 1st Deputy of the Chairman of the Staff Administration of the CC. In 1947 he was appointed Editor-in-Chief of the journal „Партийная жизнь” (CP Life) and in 1950, Head of the Planning, Finances and Trade Department of the CC. After Stalin's death in 1953, Shatalin became Secretary of the CPSU CC for two years. After that, he was briefly 1st Secretary of the CP Committee in Primorye Kray (1955–1956), Deputy of the Minister of State Audit (1956–1957) and member of the Soviet Control Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1957–1960). He retired in 1960 and died in 1984. See more on his biography: Юрий Горячев, *Центральный комитет КПСС, ВКП(б), РКП(б), РСДРП(б). Историко-биографический справочник* (Yuri Goryachev, *The Central Committee of the CPSU, SC(b)P, RC(b)P, RSDL(b)P. Historical-Biographical Guide*) (Moscow, 2005), 424; Константин Залесский, *Империя Сталина. Биографический энциклопедический словарь* (Konstanting Zaleskiy, *The Empire of Stalin. Encyclopaedic Biographical Lexicon*), (Москва: Вече, 2000), 487.

³⁵ After leaving Estonia, Georgiy Perov (1905–1979) was Secretary of the Collective Farms Council at the Council of Ministers of the USSR, (1947–1948), then deputy chairman of the State Plan (1948–1955 and 1957–1958), deputy chairman of the State Economic Commission (1955–1957), 1st Deputy of the Chairman of the State Planning Committee and Chairman of the Price Commission of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1959–1962). In the last two offices, he also had the status of Minister. Retired in 1962, died in 1979. On his biography, see more:

appointed Shatalin's deputy. Under Perov's time as chairman, Viktor Yefremov became deputy chairman. After Shatalin had been called back to Moscow, also the post of the Chairman of the Latvian Bureau became vacant, and Vasiliy Ryazanov, who had been a high official in Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC in 1944–1945, was appointed to Shatalin's post in the Latvian Bureau.³⁶ When the Latvian Bureau was liquidated, Ryazanov became a CPSU CC instructor, who specialised on the Baltic union republics, and quite soon, he was also checking on Estonia.³⁷ After Mikhail Suslov was called back to Moscow, his post in the Lithuanian Bureau was taken by Vasiliy Scherbakov.³⁸

In addition to the functionaries dispatched from Moscow, the Bureau also included representatives of the CP and executive powers of the respective Union Republic: 1st Secretary of the ECP CC Nikolai Karotamm and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the ESSR (the government) Arnold Veimer.³⁹ It is remarkable that initially the authorities of the respective union republic were not intended to belong to the Bureau at all, but this rigid position was abandoned later.⁴⁰

Also the representatives of state security agencies (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, hereinafter the NKVD, and the People's Commissariat of State Security, hereinafter the NKGB) had an important role in the Bureau. In Estonia, this post was held first by Nikolay Sazykin, and later Nikolay Gorlinskiy.⁴¹ The fact that highly appreciated figures of the security structures were appointed as representatives of the Bureau indicates clearly that Estonia was by no means an unimportant region for Moscow. No doubt it was hoped that Sazykin's and Gorlinskiy's earlier experience would be useful in the sovietisation of Estonia. For instance, in summer 1941, Sazykin had been People's Commissar of State Security in the Moldavian SSR, and organised a massive

Сергей Гарнюк, *Совет Народных Комиссаров СССР. Совет Министров СССР. Кабинет Министров СССР. Энциклопедический справочник* (Sergey Garnyuk, The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Council of Ministers of the USSR. Encyclopaedic Reference Book), (Moscow, 1999), 396; Владимир Ивкин, *Государственная власть СССР, высшие органы власти и управления и их руководители 1923–1991. Историко-биографический справочник* (Vladimir Ivkin, Authority of the State in USSR, Higher Authorities and Institutions and Their Leadership in 1923–1991. Historical-Biographical Reference Book) (Moscow: РОССПЭН, 1999), 468-469; Tarvel, 40, footnote 47.

³⁶ ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты, 451.

³⁷ Ryazanov was Inspector of the CPSU CC in 1947–1948. Later he became deputy of the Minister of Cinematography of the USSR (1948–1953), and was then deputy head and head of the General Administration of Cinematography of the Minister of Culture (1953–1954) and head of the staff administration of the same Ministry (1954–1957). For a brief period he was an editor of the magazine "Кинемеханик" (The Cinema Mechanic), and until his retirement in 1966, deputy chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs at the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

³⁸ Tininis, 98.

³⁹ The shorthand records of the 1944 December Plenum of the ECP CC state, in the words of Karotamm, that the bureau "includes the following comrades from the CPSU: Shatulín, Perov, Sosylkin, and the ESSR comrades Karotamm and Veimer". So initially, the shorthand typist had difficulties with the right spelling of the names of the „Moscow comrades“. See more: Karotamm's report at the ECP CC Plenum, 1 December 1944, ERAF 1.4.104, 10.

⁴⁰ Зубкова, *Прибалтика*.

⁴¹ See more about their biographies: Никита Петров, Константин Скоркин, *Кто руководил НКВД 1934–1941*, (Nikita Petrov, Konstantin Skorkin, Who Was at the Head of the NKVD 1934–1941), (Moscow: Звенья), 372–373; Никита Петров, *Кто руководил органами госбезопасности, 1941–1954 гг. Справочник* (Nikita Petrov, Who Were at the Head of the Institutions of State Security in 1944–1954, Reference Book), (Moscow: Мемориал, Звенья, 2010), 303–304.

deportation there.⁴² During the war, he was first the head of the special department⁴³ of the Southern Front, and later head of the 3rd Department in the central apparatus of the NKVD.

Sazykin was appointed representative to the Bureau on 22 November 1944, and immediately had to get involved in suppressing the resistance movement. Under that very period, Estonia was the most dangerous region of all the three Baltic union republics, and an operative group under the command of Vsevolod Merkulov, People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR himself, had been dispatched from the centre to "pacify" the situation. Moscow's strong focus on Estonia at the time was due to the fact that in early October 1944, the state security agencies of the USSR had received more detailed information about the formation of Otto Tief's Government on 18 September 1944 in Tallinn.⁴⁴ Sazykin was member of the Bureau until September 1945.

In the circumstances prevailing in Estonia, also Gorlinskiy's experience as Deputy of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR in 1938–1940 was hoped to come in useful. Later, Gorlinskiy was employed in the central apparatus of the security structures.

Both Sazykin and Gorlinskiy were trusted by Lavrentiy Beria. After Stalin's death in 1953, they both became heads of central departments of the Ministry⁴⁵ of Internal Affairs, to which the Ministry of State Security had been attached.⁴⁶ Before that, Gorlinskiy had managed to spend a brief period – February–April of 1949 – as Minister of State Security of the Lithuanian SSR, and organised the March deportations there. After that, he accepted the post of the head of the security administration of Leningrad. He was one of the key persons in "the Leningrad trial". Also the security representative of the Latvian Bureau Aleksey Babkin had some experience as Minister, as he had been the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and State Security of the Kazakh SSR in 1940–1943. In 1944–1945, he was head of the NKGB administration in Chelyabinsk. Babkin served as the representative of state security agencies in the Latvian Bureau from March 1945 to April 1947.⁴⁷

⁴² About N. Sazykin's activities in Moldavia in 1940–1941, see more: http://baza.md/engine/print.php?newsid=43&news_page=1 [20 May 2011].

⁴³ In Russian *Особый отдел* – the sub-unit of state security in the military units of the Red Army and later also the Soviet Army, engaged in surveillance of the staff and in counter-intelligence.

⁴⁴ See more: Tõnu Tannberg, „Wie bekämpft man die Waldbrüder? Die baltische Frage im Kreml Ende 1944" (Struggle against the Forest Brothers. The Baltic Question in the Kremlin at the End of 1944), *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte*, 4 (2009): 190–209.

⁴⁵ After Stalin's Death the Ministry of State Security was attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1954. The sphere of state security was once again separated, but in the form of the State Security Committee at the Council of Ministers (KGB).

⁴⁶ Lavrentiy Beria's fall had grave effect on the career of all those that had stood close to him. In 1954, Sazykin was dismissed from the state security structures and had to serve in the system of the Ministry of Medium Mechanical Industry. Died in Moscow in 1985. Gorlinskiy had for a short period been dismissed from security structures already in 1951, but in 1953 this happened again on the grounds of misuse of power and larceny of state property; nor did his participation in "the Leningrad trial" go unnoticed. In 1954, he was demoted and in the following year expelled from the party. In 1964, his rank of General was reinstated. Died in 1965.

⁴⁷ Петров and Скоркин, 97.

Table. The representatives of the state security agencies in the Baltic union republics in 1944–1945⁴⁸

Union republic	Representative of the state security agencies	Employed	Previously employed as
Estonian SSR	3rd Rank State Security Commissar Nikolay Sazykin	22 Nov 1944 – 14 Sept 1945	Head of the 2nd department of the NKGB
	3rd Rank State Security Commissar Nikolay Gorlinskiy	14 Sept 1945 – April 1947	Head of the NKGB Administration in Krasnodar Kray
Latvian SSR	3rd Rank State Security Commissar Aleksey Babkin	10 March 1945 – 21 April 1947	Head of the NKGB Administration in Chelyabinsk
Lithuanian SSR	State Security Commissar Ivan Tkachenko	14 Dec 1944 – 21 April 1947	Head of the NKGB Administration in the Stavropol Oblast

The task of representatives of the security structures was to co-ordinate locally the suppression of the resistance movement and the cleansing of the society of “hostile elements”. In a broader sense, the security representatives had to “keep an eye” on all the developments in the society. Supervisory control of the leadership of the union republic, as well as the leaders of the Bureau, and forwarding the relevant information directly to Moscow, was also included in their duties. Here the activities of the security representative of the Lithuanian Bureau Ivan Tkachenko provide a brilliant example;⁴⁹ for instance, in June 1945 he personally⁵⁰ informed Lavrentiy Beria on the situation in the leadership of the Lithuanian SSR. Beria was reported on the work discipline of each Bureau member, and more importantly, on how slack and resentful they were in their struggle against the “anti-Soviet elements”. It is also pointed out that the leaders of the union republic have held “closed meetings”, where the “Russian comrades” have not been invited, meaning especially Aleksandr Issachenko, 2nd Secretary of the Lithuanian CP.⁵¹ Still, Tkachenko did not fail to mention that Suslov, Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau, “did little work”, and could often be seen “reading fiction” in working hours; furthermore, he had spent most of the time in Moscow and had only made one or two “excursions to the counties”.⁵² Nevertheless, the main task of the bureaus and the representatives was to lead and co-ordinate the struggle against the resistance movement.

⁴⁸ Table composed on the basis of: Петров, 85, 108.

⁴⁹ Suslov had brought Tkatchenko from Stavropol, where the latter had been the Chief of State Security of the kray.

⁵⁰ The information sent to Moscow was, indeed, in addition to “confidential”, marked also as “personal”.

⁵¹ Special report of the Representative of the NKGB and the NKVD in the Lithuanian Bureau of the CPSU CC Tkatchenko to Beria from 19 June 1945. ЛУБЯНКА. Сталин и НКВД-НКГБ-ГУКР «Смерш». 1939 – март 1946 (Moscow: Международный фонд “Демократия”, 2006), 528–532.

⁵² Special report of the Representative of the NKGB and the NKVD in the Lithuanian Bureau of the CPSU CC Tkatchenko to Beria from 19 June 1945 – ЛУБЯНКА, 532. About Tkatchenko’s activities see more: Arvydas Anušauskas (ed.), *Lietuva 1940–1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija* (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2005), 272–274, 283, 305, 350.

In addition to the official members of the bureau, also other officials connected to it played a relatively important role. Besides the technical staff (interpreters, typists, etc) there was also a large number of so-called “responsible employees”, who were involved also in substantial matters to a considerable extent – they analysed the collected data, composed memos, attended the meetings of party and executive authorities, had meetings with “the people” etc. They were the actual assistants of the Bureau’s Chairman and his deputies. As to the Estonian bureau, more than 30 people were involved with it in 1944–1947.⁵³

Representatives of the union republic bureaus actively participated also in the meetings of the bureaus of the CCs of the respective union republic CP organisations. During the existence of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC from December 1944 to March 1947, a total of 233 meetings of the ECP CC Bureau were held, and only on 10 occasions no representative from the Moscow bureau was present. According to Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi, at least 12 different representatives of the Bureau participated on the meetings of the ECP CC Bureau under that period. The first chairman of the Bureau – Nikolay Shatalin – was present at the end of 1944 and proceeded then to Riga, to take hand also of the Latvian Bureau of the CPSU CC, and in the next year, 1945, he was present only on two occasions. His deputy and the later chairman of the Bureau, Georgiy Perov, on the other hand, attended a total of 92 ECP CC Bureau meetings. Other more active participants in the ECP CC Bureau meetings were Viktor Yefremov (89), Feodor Kaloshin (24) N. Gorlinskiy (13) and Nikolay Stukokskiy (9).⁵⁴

The bureaus of the union republics were accountable to the CPSU CC. Their directives and orders to the local authorities were to be fulfilled. The usual working principle was to discuss more important matters first in the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, and later also in the ECP CC Bureau. Still, the Moscow bureau did not duplicate the ECP CC Bureau, i.e. not all matters were taken up on the CPSU CC Estonian Bureau meetings. If some decision adopted or information addressed to Moscow did not please the Moscow bureau, the decision or information was to be reviewed. For instance, on the meeting of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, Nikolai Karotamm’s letter to Vyacheslav Molotov, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR at the time, was pronounced erroneous; in his letter, the ECP leader proposed to introduce diplomatic relations between the Estonian SSR and Sweden. Karotamm was convinced that opening an Embassy of the Estonian SSR in Sweden would help to improve the repatriation of exile Estonians. The Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, on the other hand, pronounced the sending of such letter erroneous, as it had not been previously concorded with the Bureau.⁵⁵

In his speech held on the December plenum of the ECP CC, which has already been quoted above, Karotamm described the role of the Estonian Bureau as follows: “The task of this bureau is to guide the ECP CC in solving all the tasks we are facing now, to improve our work as a whole, to correct the mistakes, to overcome the deficiencies in our work and to raise it to the necessary bolshevist level”.⁵⁶ The 1st Secretary of the Latvian CP J. Kalnbērziņš, on the other hand, was much

⁵³ Veskimägi, 102.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 112. In the second half of November 1944, the Bureau was first attended by the Moscow trio: Shatalin, Perov and Sazykin, later they also attended one by one. See more: Tõnu Tannberg (comp), *EKP KK Büroo istungite registid*. 1, kd. 1940–1954 (Regests of the Meetings of the ECP CC Bureau. Volume I, 1940 – 1954), (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2006), 72–76.

⁵⁵ See more: Hilda Sabbo, *Võimatu vaikida. III, Eesti inventuur* (Silence is Impossible. III, Estonian Inventory), (Tallinn: H. Sabbo, 1998), 730.

⁵⁶ Karotamm’s report at the ECP CC Plenum, 1 December 1944, ERAF 1.4.104, 10.

more open-minded about the grounds of the formation of the Bureau when speaking on the meeting held after his return from Moscow on 6 November 1944. He informed his audience that according to Malenkov, the Bureau had been created to help the leaders of the union republic to make Latvia into a union republic following the Soviet pattern, and added: “If we cannot manage it ourselves, they will find people whose hand does not falter.”⁵⁷ This was the unwavering line to be pursued by the new bureau. The background of the formation of the Lithuanian Bureau was explained by Mikhail Suslov at the end of December 1944 on the plenum of the CC of the Lithuanian CP. The Moscow representative explained that the local party organisation and cadre were too young and inexperienced to fulfil the “unusually great and complicated” tasks facing the union republic, and that was the reason for formation of the special bureau. This, according to him, was why the CPSU CC had formed the union republic bureau in order to educate the local cadre and to strengthen the party organisations. It is remarkable that Suslov did not deny that the bureau in question was “a temporary organisation”; he also referred to earlier experience of the utilisation of such institutions in building up the Soviet power (the Far East Bureau, the Caucasian Bureau).⁵⁸

Also the first public address of the high-empowered Moscow emissary to the party functionaries of the Estonian SSR in early December 1944 is noteworthy. Nikolay Shatalin stated at the very start of his address that in the foreseeable future, it is necessary to establish “real Soviet power” in Estonia. He admitted that although the Soviet power in the territory of the Estonian SSR was manifest in all its forms, it had not yet become fully “consolidated”. In addition, he informed his audience that the Soviet power had arrived in Estonia in 1940–1941 “in a somewhat unusual manner”, by which he meant that there had been no proper dismantling of the “bourgeois regime”. In 1941, many “bourgeois” phenomena still lingered; also the Germans had restored many of them and added their own “Fascist touches”.

In Shatalin’s opinion there were still some people in the Estonian SSR, especially bourgeois nationalists, who antagonised the establishment of the new power. He also said that among the leadership of the union republic there were some who meant, referring to the special traits of the Estonians, that it would be possible to implement the new power “without doing harm, without any fighting”. This was a most erroneous approach, the Moscow emissary stated. There was also a fair amount of those who believed that the need to enhance the struggle against bourgeois nationalism had been overrated, as nothing extraordinary could happen in Estonia. Also this approach had to be considered incorrect. Vigilance against the enemy was to be maintained. Shatalin considered the issue of strengthening and cleansing of the cadre to be of utmost importance.⁵⁹

Thus, the guidelines for further activities had been set quite clearly by the Moscow emissary. Also Hans Kruus, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Estonian SSR, understood the directions of Moscow very well, and was convinced that “In the great construction programme of the Soviet Estonia, the political, ideological and spiritual moulding of our people, our entire society, is one of the matters of highest priority”. According to Kruus there was a need for “new men and women, free from the poisonous fetters of prejudice instigated and spread by the previous, bourgeois regime, and especially the Fascism”. Kruus stated that the CPSU CC had given highest priority to the task of struggle against bourgeois nationalism, and the task had to be approached with utmost

⁵⁷ Swain, 65.

⁵⁸ Suslov’s address at the Plenum of the Lithuanian CP CC, 30 December 1944. – Tininis, 261–262.

⁵⁹ Shatalin’s address at the ECP CC Plenum, 2 December 1944, ERAF 1.4.107, 152–157.

severity. He invited everyone “to scrub our society mentally clean of the filth of Fascism and bourgeois nationalism”.⁶⁰

The leaders of the Estonian SSR were at first suspicious of the Moscow emissaries, understanding only too clearly their function as a body of control. Yet no major antagonism developed between the union republic leaders and the Bureau. It seems that Karotamm and Shatalin saw eye to eye in many matters. Shatalin did not interfere powerfully with the running of the union republic. He followed the same pattern in Latvia and Mikhail Suslov, Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau, generally had the same attitude. The latter stated in one of the reports submitted to Moscow that initially, the relations with local leaders had been quite “reserved” and that the Lithuanian party leader Anantas Sniečkus had asked him outright: will the “Russian comrades” now play the leading role in the Union Republic? After a while – when it was clear that the local leaders would not be superseded – the relations normalised. Vasiliy Ryazanov, on the other hand, informed Moscow that at first, he did not consider it necessary to convene the meetings of the CPSU CC Bureau,⁶¹ so as not to invoke the distrust of local leadership. This way, Ryazanov could state that all the Bureau’s recommendations were taken into account and all the necessary decisions had been taken “with the hand of the Latvian CP CC and the Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR”.⁶²

Georgiy Perov’s leadership style was quite different. Under his chairmanship, the Estonian Bureau held frequent meetings and discussed also matters of quite secondary nature. Perov saw it his duty also to issue many more guidelines. For instance, a decision was adopted that obligated the leadership of the union republic to participate in mass meetings. In 1946, also the topic of the magazine/almanac “Mood” (Couture) was discussed by the Bureau as part of Perov’s and others’ struggle against the local nationalism. An observant ideology watchman had discovered a combination of blue, black and white in the magazine, and that gave cause to address also the content of the publication. The observant watchman was August Kelberg, who spoke of the reasons for taking up the matter of the almanac on the March plenum of 1950. On that party meeting, addressing Eduard Päll, August Kelberg said the following:

“When I came from the army in 1946 and became Head of the Journalism Sector of the ECP CC, I was presented with a magazine published by the Institute of Applied Art. The magazine was published in the colours of the former bourgeois flag and had no artistic value whatsoever. Exceeding my authority, I banned the magazine. Then, a hell of a fuss was made, Adamson-Eric came running, complained to Karotamm, and a meeting was convened. 15 minutes before the meeting, you read out Comrade Karotamm’s letter concerning the magazine. It said that people who have no understanding of art should not be allowed to interfere, and you should yourself be in charge, and you advised me to keep my mouth shut at the meeting. I said that if the reputation of the 1st Secretary of the ECP CC required it, I would keep silent, but hold on to my position. The CC meeting was attended also by the CPSU CC representative Comrade Buzulukov and Comrade Käbin. They denounced the magazine and after the interference of Comrade Perov, we succeeded in destroying the typeset of the magazine and stop the publication, even if the circulation was 50,000 copies.”⁶³

⁶⁰ Kruus’ address at the ECP CC Plenum, 2 December 1944, ERAF 1.4.107, 32–37.

⁶¹ During its first year and a half, the Latvian Bureau of the CPSU CC only held a single meeting.

⁶² Зубкова, “Советский фактор,” 194–211; Зубкова, “Москва и Балтия,” 266–283.

⁶³ “A. Kelbergi sõnavõtt EK(b)P KK VIII pleenumil, 1950,” (A. Kelberg’ address on the 8th Plenum of the ECP CC, 1950), *Akadeemia* no. 5 (1999): 1089–1990. See more: Kalev Tammistu, „Tasalülitamine 29,” (Assimilation 29), *Õhtuleht*, 12 June 1989; Uno Liivaku, *Eesti raamatu lugu* (Story of the Estonian Book) (Tallinn: Monokkel, 1995), 221–222.

Kelberg's story is elaborated in the documents of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, indicating that Buzulukov had informed Perov of the substance of the matter on 4 July 1946, announcing that publication of the almanac "Mood" in its present form can be interpreted as a demonstration by reactionary powers. It is mentioned that blue, black and white is not the only combination of colours manifest in the magazine, but that even the colours of the Nazi Germany have been used. Perov himself has added a note to the letter to the effect of taking up the matter on the bureau meeting on 31 July.⁶⁴ The meeting mentioned by A. Kelberg took place already on 8 July in the office of Eduard Päll, who was the ECP CC's ideological secretary at the time, and was allegedly attended by the officials of the CC apparatus, as well as Head of the Administration of Arts of the ESSR Johannes Semper, Adamson-Eric, and "the invited women".⁶⁵ The artistic level of the almanac was considered low, and accusations were made of copying old German and French magazines. Yet it was "the invited women" – technical staff from the propaganda department – whose expert opinion proved to be crucial, and who gave their "fair" assessment: "This is like a gob of phlegm in the face of the Soviet woman".⁶⁶

According to Buzulukov, Eduard Päll had at the end of the meeting also announced the position of Karotamm, who had also considered the almanac to be of low standard and decided that publication was out of the question. As a result, the whole circulation of the almanac was confiscated and destroyed. Buzulukov concluded his report with a proposal: to compile an album that would be truly worthy of the attention of the Soviet woman.⁶⁷ The Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC in turn confirmed that the use of blue, black and white had "made allowances to the bourgeois nationalist feelings of the enemies of the Soviet power".⁶⁸

Also Vasiliy Scherbakov, becoming Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau, was rather more pretentious and ambitious than his predecessor Suslov, who blatantly considered himself to be the actual ruler of the union republic and paid no heed to the local circumstances.⁶⁹

From Moscow's point of view, the union republic bureaus had fulfilled their purpose by spring 1947. The matter was first discussed in the Organisational Bureau on 19 March 1947, and this was followed up by the decision of the Politburo from 24 March 1947, which liquidated the union republic bureaus in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The decision stated that "considering the work done to enhance the party, Soviet, and economic leadership", the bureaus had fulfilled their purpose and that in the future, those functions could be carried out directly by the Central Committees of the CPs of the respective union republics.⁷⁰ Also Aleksandr Pankseyev has emphasised that the Estonian Bureau was liquidated when "the party organisation of the union republic had acquired the necessary leadership experience".⁷¹ Indeed, on a broader plane, this step may be seen as a confirmation that from Moscow's viewpoint, the foundations of the new power had been built – a certain transition period in the sovietisation process was over, the local

⁶⁴ Buzulukov to Perov, 4 July 1946, RGASPI 598.1.7, 86.

⁶⁵ Buzulukov to Perov, 8 July 1946, RGASPI 598.1.7, 87.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Зубкова, "Советский фактор," 199.

⁶⁹ Tininis, 101.

⁷⁰ Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, 24 March 1947. – ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты, 23.

⁷¹ Pankseyev, *Suure heitluse*, 94. The work does not mention when the Estonian Bureau was liquidated.

functionaries and authorities had already won the Kremlin's trust and there was no further need for this kind of controlling and assisting institution.

It was obviously not by chance that the spring of 1947 was chosen for closing down the Bureaus. This seems to be directly connected to the elections of the Supreme Soviets of the union republics that was considered to be an important step in the formal legitimisation of the new power. In the first Soviet year (1940–1941) there was no time to organise “real” elections in the occupied Baltic states, in Estonia they were limited to the elections of the *2nd Riigivolikogu*, and no local elections took place. Therefore, the issue of elections came up acutely after the war. It was necessary to hold new elections on the whole territory of the Soviet Union. In most of the union republics of the USSR elections were held in 1947, but in the Baltic union republics the local Soviets were not elected before early 1948.⁷²

As those elections passed without any major incidents, Moscow was sustained in the notion that locally the situation is under control of the leaders of the respective union republics. As the elections – although typically Soviet, with a single candidate and all too predictable result – were an important action from the viewpoint of sovietising the territories and legitimising the Soviet power, the authorities tried to make very thorough preparations. The post-war elections were important from propaganda aspect, they had to convince the public and the whole world that the Soviet power was permanently rooted in the recently occupied territories. Still, the authorities were prepared for possible excessive developments, especially during the elections of the Supreme Soviets in 1947. Most of the polling stations were guarded by military units.⁷³ Also Dmitriy Yazov (born 1923), who later became Marshal and was the last Minister of Defence of the USSR (in 1987–1991), was among the guards.⁷⁴

The delegates of the 2nd composition of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR (as the 1st composition the former *2nd Riigivolikogu*, since August 1940 the (temporary) Supreme Soviet, was treated) were elected in February 1947. A total of 100 delegates was elected to the legislative body of the union republic, and according to the official data, the percentage of votes in favour was 96.17, whereas the percentage of participants was 99.33 of the total number of voters.⁷⁵ Yet in the elections of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the number of contrary citizens was higher. According to the official data from that time, the share of votes against in Estonia was the largest in the whole USSR – 5.6%. Officially, only 820,000 people in the whole Soviet Union, or 0.81%, voted against on the elections of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In the contemporary reports of the state security agencies, which reflected the sentiments of the population, ignoring the elections was recorded in many cases. Jaan Sarv, Professor of mathematics in Tartu University, received four visits from propaganda workers on the election day, and announced to them: “I am not against the Soviet power, which is paying me well for my work. All my family has already voted, but I am not going, because elections are free.” So the

⁷² For Soviet-style treatises of the election see: Eerik-Juhan Truuväli, *Valimisõigus ja valimised Eestis 1917-1980*, 2. osa (Electoral Rights and Elections in Estonia in 1917–1980, Part II), (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1986).

⁷³ See more: Tiit Noormets, “Kõik valimisringkonnad ja -jaoskonnad on kaetud valvega ... Nõukogude valimised julgeolekudokumentide peeglis” (All Electoral Districts and Polling Stations Under Control ... the Soviet Elections Reflected in the Security Documents), *Tuna*, no. 3 (2004): 79–82.

⁷⁴ Дмитрий Язов, *Удары судьбы: Воспоминания солдата и маршала* (Blows of Fate: Memoirs of a Soldier and a Marshal) (Moscow: Палея, 1999), 94.

⁷⁵ Truuväli, 120.

special notice of the Ministry of Security of the ESSR could but concede: “Sarv did not vote”.⁷⁶ The security structures took detailed note also of all the “anti-Soviet” scribbles on the ballots, and a list was made of the polling stations where the number of votes against had proved to be “quite considerable”. Larger number of votes against was observed mostly in Pärnu and Harju County. For instance in the electoral district No. 44 in Pärnu County, a total of 7014 people voted and there were 607 (8.6%) votes against, and 120 (1.7%) ballots were pronounced invalid. In the polling station No. 24 in Harju County, where Arnold Kress was set up as candidate, a total of 435 people voted, and of those 87 or 20% voted against.⁷⁷ There was a similar situation in several electoral districts. Later, of course, the data was “smoothed over” to give a more or less desired general picture.⁷⁸

For the post-war Soviet authorities, it was very important to hold the 1947 elections to the Supreme Soviet without major failures, especially in the territories occupied in 1939–1940, including the Baltic union republics. The elections were supposed to confirm the formal legality of the Soviet power. The leaders of the three Baltic union republics succeeded in this task, and therefore there was no longer need for Moscow to execute institutional control over them. Furthermore, the leaders of the respective union republics had been informed from the beginning of the temporary nature of the Bureaus, and after the success of the elections, it would have been difficult to justify their further existence. The lingering of status quo could have created tensions in the power relations between the centre and the union republics. The local elections held in spring 1948 were not of similar importance in Moscow’s view, but rather a mere matter of form.

After the liquidation of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC, most of the people involved with that institution left Estonia. But not everyone left, and for instance Nikolay Skutokskiy became an official of the ECP CC apparatus. Another “responsible” official of the Estonian Bureau of the CPSU CC remaining in Estonia was Nikolay Buzulukov, who made a splendid career as scientist, rising to such heights as an ordinary member of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR.⁷⁹ In 1951–1953, he was the Academic Secretary of the Academy. In 1955, nevertheless, he had to leave Estonia.⁸⁰ Also most of the employees of the Latvian and Lithuanian Bureaus left the respective union republics after the liquidation of the bureaus. And again, not everyone did. For instance

⁷⁶ Deputy Minister of Security of the ESSR Mikhailov’s special report to A. Veimer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the ESSR, 17 February 1947, ERA R-1.5.154, 195.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 199.

⁷⁸ No specific research has as yet been published in the practices of the Soviet-style elections and the forging of election results. It is a characteristic detail that the voters did not confirm receipt of ballot papers, a note of the electoral committee was sufficient. This made it easy for the electoral committee to forge the results. See: Allan Puur and Liivi Uuet, “Eesti NSV 1940.–1950. aastate valimiste materjalid rahvastikuloo allikana” (Materials of the 1940–1950 Elections of the Estonian SSR as Source of Historical Demography), *Tuna*, no. 2 (2010): 63–64.

⁷⁹ Veskimägi, 184.

⁸⁰ Buzulukov had come to Estonia in 1946. After the liquidation of the Estonian Bureau of the ECP CC, he was employed in the Institute of Economics of the ESSR Academy of Sciences, preparing his doctoral thesis on collectivisation. In 1951, he became the full member of the ESSR Academy of Sciences. But in 1953, ECP CC “discovered” “serious political errors” in his works. Actually, this “sentence” was due to the fact that in his works, Buzulukov had also referred to the speeches of Karotamm, who by that time had fallen from grace. This support proved fatal. In 1953, he lost his post in the Academy of Sciences, and after a while, was forced to leave Estonia altogether (see more: Olaf Kuuli, *Stalini-aja võimukaader ja kultuurijuhid Eesti NSV-s (1940–1954)* (Staff in State Authorities and Cultural Leaders in the Estonian SSR in Stalin’s Time (1940–1951)) (Tallinn: O. Kuuli, 2007), 138). Buzulukov’s case is quite an eloquent example of Johannes Käbin’s methods and staff policies.

Vasily Pisarev, representative of the Lithuanian Bureau, became 1st Deputy of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuanian SSR.⁸¹

And yet, the Kremlin did not trust all the new union republics quite as much as it had decided to trust the Baltic union republics in 1947. It is typical that the Moldavian Bureau of similar purpose, formed 13 March 1945, was not liquidated at the same time.⁸² The formation of the Moldavian Bureau had been preceded by a discussion in the Organisational Bureau of the CPSU CC, and a separate decision “On the Situation of Political Work with the Population and Measures for Its Improvement in the Moldavian SSR” had been adopted on 28 February 1945.⁸³ The Moldavian Bureau existed until 1949. Even then, Moscow was not content with the situation in Moldavia, and instead of the Bureau, the institution of representative had to act as an intermediary between Moscow and Chisinau.⁸⁴ The relevant decision was adopted in April 1949. Setting up the institution of representative is explained with a remark that it had been done to strengthen “the bonds between the CPSU CC and the Moldavian CP CC”, in order to guarantee timely arrival of adequate information and to enhance the control over how Moscow’s instructions were being followed.⁸⁵ The issue of Moldavia had already been discussed on the 9 April meeting, where also the leadership of the union republic participated. In the meeting, it was stated point blank that the leaders of the union republic had not succeeded in timely discovery and liquidation of the “anti-Soviet elements”, had made mistakes in educating the cadre, and failed to denounce the works of several authors and historians that praised feudal Moldavia and gave a biased picture of the events of World War II.⁸⁶ Thus the Moldavian Bureau of the CPSU CC had failed to fulfil its purpose and was also liquidated. And a new supervisor from Moscow was appointed – the CPSU CC representative, the former CC Inspector M. Turkin, who stayed in this office until 1950.⁸⁷

On broader plane, the institution of the bureaus had justified itself in the eyes of the Kremlin elite, as in February 1949, also Central Asian and Far East Bureaus were formed. Furthermore – by the abovementioned decision of the Politburo, also a separate statute of the CPSU CC Bureau was adopted, and its provisions were certainly valid also for the earlier Latvian, Lithuanian, and

⁸¹ Tininis, 102.

⁸² Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, 13 March 1945. – ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты, 40, footnote 2. Also this decision states unambiguously that observing of the decisions of the CC Bureau was obligatory for the leadership of the Moldavian SSR. The primary tasks of the Bureau according to that document are “enhancing” of the authorities of the union republic, increasing their authority, unrelenting struggle against the so-called bourgeois nationalism, taking measures for the restoration of people’s economy, enhancing political propaganda work and education of the Soviet cadre “in the spirit of Bolshevism”. About activities of the Moldavian Bureau of the CPSU CC in detail see: Валерий Пасат, “Молдавия в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941–1945)” – Война 1941–1945 годов. Современные подходы. *Россия в XX веке* (Valeriy Pasat, Moldavia in the Years of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), The War of 1941–1945. Modern Approaches. Russia in the 20th Century), (Moscow: Наука, 2005), 199–203.

⁸³ Report of the Moldavian Bureau of the CPSU CC from 1 April 1945 – 1 November 1946. – Валерий Пасат, *Трудные страницы истории Молдовы 1940–1950-е гг.* (Valeriy Pasat, Difficult Pages in the History of Moldova 1940–1950), (Moscow: Изд. центр «Терра», 1994), 237.

⁸⁴ The fact that the report of the Moldavian Bureau was separately discussed in the Organisational Bureau of the CPSU CC in October 1948, and a separate decision was adopted, is another clear sign of Moscow’s disapproval. See more: Decision of the Organisational Bureau of the CPSU CC, 4 October 1948. – Пасат, *Трудные страницы*, 321–327.

⁸⁵ Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU CC from 24 April 1949. – ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты, 38–39.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 39–40, footnote 1.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

Estonian bureaus.⁸⁸ Still, the Central Asian and the Far East bureaus did not operate for a very long time.⁸⁹ The institution of the CPSU CC representative, on the other hand, was made use of to control e.g. the Uzbek SSR.⁹⁰

Thus, the CPSU CC bureaus in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (and Moldavia) were extraordinary authorities, whose competence included practically every area of the government of the union republics. Comprehensively, the prime tasks of the bureaus of the three Baltic union republics were the following:

- assistance in setting the Soviet-style power apparatus to work, composition of the staff;
- implementation of the socialist economic model, especially by means of land reform and creating the preconditions for collectivisation, promotion of large-scale industry;
- suppression of the resistance movement and cleansing the society of „hostile elements“;
- muzzling the society’s intellectual circles according to the Soviet pattern;
- control over the leaderships of the union republics and keeping the centre informed.

To put it plainly, the task of the bureaus was to start an efficient sovietisation process and implement it soonest possible, in order to make the process irreversible in a short period of time.

⁸⁸ Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU CC from 10 February 1949. – *ibid.*, 36–37.

⁸⁹ In late 1950s, those ideas were rediscovered, but in another context and with different purposes. This time, the topical issue was the “amalgamation” of all Soviet peoples, which in Nikita Khrushchev’s opinion was an irreversible process. This in its turn was supposed to gradually eliminate the need for the existence of union republics, as the development of unified economic regions was supposed to become far more important compared to the ethnic-territorial division. In the light of those ideas, also party leadership had to be reorganised in order to facilitate the formation of major economic regions. In Khrushchev’s time the Central Asian Bureau of the CPSU CC was formed to execute party control in the Central Asian union republics (Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen). For Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, a similar Trans-Caucasian Bureau of the CPSU CC was formed. The primary purpose for the formation of those two bureaus was no longer to enhance Moscow’s control; they were rather oriented towards economic goals – formation of the united economic region, which would diminish the ethnic and political status of the union republics (See more: Абдурахман Авторханов, *Империя Кремля* (Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *The Empire of Kremlin*) (Moscow: ДИКА-М, 2002), 280–282.

⁹⁰ Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU CC from 28 March 1949. – *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, 37–38.